History of the World/History of the World (Bureau Development, Inc.)(1992).BIN/dp/0436/04369.txt

Text File | 1992-10-12 | 8KB | 176 lines

$Unique_ID{how04369}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Rough Riders
Appendix C}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Roosevelt, Theodore}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{army
commanding
division
fever
brigade
general
present
first
move
moved}
$Date{}
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Title:       Rough Riders
Book:        Appendix C
Author:      Roosevelt, Theodore

Appendix C

     [The following is the report of the Associated Press correspondent of the
"round-robin" incident.  It is literally true in every detail.  I was present
when he was handed both letters; he was present while they were being
written.]

     Santiago De Cuba, August 3d (delayed in transmission). - Summoned by
Major-General Shafter, a meeting was held here this morning at head-quarters,
and in the presence of every commanding and medical officer of the Fifth Army
Corps, General Shafter read a cable message from Secretary Alger, ordering
him, on the recommendation of Surgeon-General Sternberg, to move the army into
the interior, to San Luis, where it is healthier.

     As a result of the conference General Shafter will insist upon the
immediate withdrawal of the army North.

     As an explanation of the situation the following letter from Colonel
Theodore Roosevelt, commanding the First Cavalry, to General Shafter, was
handed by the latter to the correspondent of The Associated Press for
publication:

     Major-General Shafter.

     Sir: In a meeting of the general and medical officers called by you at
the Palace this morning we were all, as you know, unanimous in our views of
what should be done with the army.  To keep us here, in the opinion of every
officer commanding a division or a brigade, will simply involve the
destruction of thousands.  There is no possible reason for not shipping
practically the entire command North at once.

     Yellow-fever cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command
one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in
this division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where
they have, I believe, contracted it.

     But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial fever.
Hardly a man has yet died from it, but the whole command is so weakened and
shattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep, when a real yellow-fever
epidemic instead of a fake epidemic, like the present one, strikes us, as it
is bound to do if we stay here at the height of the sickness season, August
and the beginning of September.  Quarantine against malarial fever is much
like quarantining against the toothache.

     All of us are certain that as soon as the authorities at Washington fully
appreciate the condition of the army, we shall be sent home.  If we are kept
here it will in all human possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the
surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the sickly
season, will die.

     This is not only terrible from the stand-point of the individual lives
lost, but it means ruin from the stand-point of military efficiency of the
flower of the American army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with
you.  The sick list, large though it is, exceeding four thousand, affords but
a faint index of the debilitation of the army.  Not twenty per cent. are fit
for active work.

     Six weeks on the North Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere where the
yellow-fever germ cannot possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as
fighting-cocks, as able as we are eager to take a leading part in the great
campaign against Havana in the fall, even if we are not allowed to try Porto
Rico.

     We can be moved North, if moved at once, with absolute safety to the
country, although, of course, it would have been infinitely better if we had
been moved North or to Porto Rico two weeks ago.  If there were any object in
keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we
faced bullets.  But there is no object.

     The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison the
city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us to do here,
and there has not been since the city surrendered.  It is impossible to move
into the interior.  Every shifting of camp doubles the sick-rate in our
present weakened condition, and, anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the
coast, as I have found by actual reconnaissance.  Our present camps are as
healthy as any camps at this end of the island can be.

     I write only because I cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely and
who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly, go to
destruction without striving so far as lies in me to avert a doom as fearful
as it is unnecessary and undeserved.

     Yours respectfully,
     Theodore Roosevelt,
     Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

     After Colonel Roosevelt had taken the initiative, all the American
general officers united in a "round robin" addressed to General Shafter. It
reads:

     We, the undersigned officers commanding the various brigades, divisions,
etc., of the Army of Occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that
this army should be at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some
point on the Northern sea-coast of the United States; that can be done without
danger to the people of the United States; that yellow fever in the army at
present is not epidemic; that there are only a few sporadic cases; but that
the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is
destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed
by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.

     We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal
observations that the army is unable to move into the interior, and that there
are no facilities for such a move if attempted, and that it could not be
attempted until too late.  Moreover, the best medical authoritiesof the island
say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during
the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly
as yellow fever.

     This army must be moved at once, or perish.  As the army can be safely
moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be
responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives.

     Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they are
also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, who
understand the situation absolutely.

     J. Ford Kent,
     Major-General Volunteers Commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.

     J. C. Bates,
     Major-General Volunteers Commanding Provisional Division.

     Adnah R. Chaffee,
     Major-General Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

     Samuel S. Summer,
     Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Cavalry.

     Will Ludlow,
     Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

     Adelbert Ames,
     Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding Third Brigade, First Division.

     Leonard Wood,
     Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding the City of Santiago.

     Theodore Roosevelt,
     Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.

     Major M. W. Wood, the chief Surgeon of the First Division, said: "The
army must be moved North," adding, with emphasis, "or it will be unable to
move itself."

     General Ames has sent the following cable message to Washington:

     Charles H. Allen, Assistant Secretary of the Navy:

     This army is incapable, because of sickness, of marching anywhere
except to the transports.  If it is ever to return to the United States it
must do so at once.